(English Newsletter by SAND Institute/June 21.2024)_

South Korea’s Response to North Korea's 'Trash Terror': Festina Lente

Kwak Gil-sup, President of One Korea Center

Since May 28, North Korea has sent trash into South Korean airspace four times (as of June 14). While North Korea's abnormal behavior is not a recent occurrence, this provocation marks a new low in the history of leaflet distribution.

Neither passively enduring nor overreacting is the best response. If the government fails to unite domestic and international public opinion, it could lead to a loss of national dignity and pride, leaving us vulnerable to further provocations and tactics aimed at creating internal conflicts.

It's Not Trash “Balloons” but Trash “Terror”

Media reports have been describing the trash stuff as "trash balloons" since the first incident. The government and military have also used this term uncritically. However, this does not accurately reflect the situation. "Trash terror" is a more precise term.

Media reports have been referring to the incidents as "trash balloons" since they began. The government and military have also adopted this term without much scrutiny. However, this term doesn't accurately capture the severity of the situation. "Trash terror" is a more precise and fitting description. 

The large amount of trash has insulted and instilled fear in the South Korean public. In some areas, trash has damaged windshields and disrupted operations at Incheon International Airport. Although the damage was not severe this time, the potential for a major accident remains. In the worst-case scenario, we could imagine North Korea deploying biological or chemical weapons in such balloons, which is terrifying. Therefore, it is crucial to accurately name the issue from the start. It is not "trash balloons" but "trash terror." 

The Background of North Korea's Choice of 'Trash Terror' Provocation

North Korea claimed that its first trash terror at the end of May was in response to the leaflet distribution by the North Korean defector group Fighters for a Free North Korea on May 10. However, this is actually a calculated multi-purpose psychological warfare, also serving as a test of hybrid warfare applied to the Korean Peninsula, a tactic recently highlighted in the Israel-Hamas conflict.

I assume North Korea's recent trash terror has the following motives:

In the long term, it is an extension of the ‘power-for-power’ strategy pursued since the diplomatic disaster in Hanoi in February 2019; In the short term, it is a practical step towards Kim Jong-un's "two-Korea policy" declared at the end of the year.

More directly, it is part of the follow-up actions to the decisions made at the Politburo meeting chaired by Kim Jong-un on May 24.

Kim Jong-un orchestrated two significant events during the Politburo of the Workers' Party of Korea meeting in late May. First, he decided to hold the "10th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK" in late June. This plenary meeting to be held just before the Supreme People's Assembly, will formalize new borders in the constitution.

Second, after hearing reports on military issues from the General Staff Department, he issued related, undisclosed orders. The content of these orders can be inferred from the statement by North Korea's vice defense minister Kim Kang-il on May 25, which warned of strong responses to South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, civilian leaflet distributions, and South Korean Navy's Northern Limit Line (NLL) violations.

Since then, North Korea has engaged in various provocations, including launching a reconnaissance satellite, trash terror against South Korea, testing the 600mm super-large multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), GPS jamming in the West Sea, violating the military demarcation line, and reinstalling loudspeaker broadcasting along the demilitarized zone. These actions indicate calculated psychological warfare and simulated attack training. Additionally, the conditional suspension announced by Kim Kang-il on June 2 ("100-fold response if leaflets are distributed again") and Kim Yo-jong's retaliation warning on June 9 ("new response to leaflet distribution and loudspeaker broadcasts") are typical hit-and-run tactics aimed at blaming South Korea for heightened tensions, characterized by low-cost, high-efficiency fear-inducing strategies.

Based on current developments, North Korea is likely to continue provoking South Korea with aggressive rhetoric and various actions. These provocations aim to create internal debates about 'war or peace' and instill fear of conflict. By the late June Plenary Meeting and the July Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea is expected to finalize and announce new borders, marking a significant step in their "two-Korea policy“.

North Korea will likely exploit South Korea's political landscape, characterized by intense conflicts and opposition, as well as the anti-American struggle period (June 25 to July 27) and the South Korea-U.S. joint nuclear exercises in August. This includes launching reconnaissance satellites, testing strategic weapons, and possibly conducting a seventh nuclear test. These maneuvers aim to dominate the Korean Peninsula situation and set the stage for new negotiations after the U.S. presidential election and the Ukraine war.

Was South Korea's Response Appropriate?

North Korea's recent provocation was somewhat anticipated, given its "two-state Korea" policy and the developments following the Workers' Party Politburo meeting, including the General Staff Department report. South Korean security officials have stated that they reviewed over 100 scenarios for North Korean provocations and prepared accordingly.

However, the government seemed unprepared for "North Korea sending trash into the air." Consequently, the initial response was neither swift nor well-coordinated. The National Security Council (NSC) Standing Committee convened only on June 2, and the military issued a basic statement calling it a "violation of international law." This prompted Kim Yo-jong to sarcastically remark, "'Freedom of expression' and 'international law' have nothing to do with the balloons."

It must be clear that the leaflets sent by South Korean civic groups are based on constitutional values, using a few items to convey outside information to North Korean residents. In contrast, North Korea scattered contaminated materials on a large scale, causing significant harm. The term "freedom of expression" cannot be applied equally to both situations. Yet, the government responded with simple criticism of North Korea instead of providing a reasonable explanation to both North Korea and the South Korean public. The initial response should have been better. If the government had responded with "Leaflets are acceptable, but trash is not," it could have justified the civilian leaflet campaigns and stirred public criticism of North Korea's actions.

Following the exchange of accusations, the South Korean government took steps: suspending the September 19 Military Agreement, putting the military on high alert, and resuming loudspeaker broadcasts. These actions aim to manage the situation and advance North Korean liberalization.

Outlook and Direction of Response

Kim Jong-un has pushed an anti-nationalistic, anti-unification "two-Korea policy" this year, unlike his predecessors. Over the past five months, he likely weighed the pros and cons and decided the benefits outweighed the costs, erasing traces of national cooperation. The recent trash terror operation is part of this strategy. It's assumed North Korea anticipated South Korea's countermeasures, such as resuming psychological warfare.

The recent provocations, including trash terror, are part of North Korea's strategy to solidify its "two Korea policy." After unsettling South Korea internally from late May to early June, North Korea is expected to adjust its tactics before Vladimir Putin's visit and the late June Party Plenary Meeting. Following the constitutional amendment at the July Supreme People's Assembly (stipulating territorial regulations), North Korea will likely intensify its offensive across all domains.

The Yoon administration should approach Kim Jong-un cautiously, avoiding complacency, and employing creative diplomacy with neighboring countries to effectively manage the Korean Peninsula crisis. Embracing this challenge as an opportunity, the government should strive to bring about fundamental transformation in the North Korean regime.

In conclusion, Kim Jong-un's objectives are threefold: to solidify his dictatorship, amplify internal conflicts within South Korea, and secure nuclear-armed status for favorable arms negotiations. The government must address these issues with comprehensive security policies and active communication with political and media leaders. History shows that unity is crucial in facing the enemy, and the strength to confront North Korea effectively comes from the people.